Ship Security


Terror was born out of the human history, psychologists have generally described that terror is mental state which get into origin of extreme fear arisen from some special threat or horror. On the other hand, Terrorism requires obedience by means of systematic violence, particularly exploit of violence as political weapons or policy. Consequently, terror is the natural phenomenon, and terrorism is the coercive aim-oriented acts by means of systematic, intentional use of violence for the purpose of exploit victims, all the people related with them and the intention of the multitude, taking advantage of violence through coercion, threat and menace. Formidable disaster, so-called 9.11, had occurred in New York, United States on 11th September 2001. Since 9.11 terror had frightened the whole world, International law system relating to anti-terrorism has changed into the age of performing concrete international cooperation, being passed through the era of executing the ex-post factor suppression called "extradite or prosecution principle" concerning prevention of terrorism.

Relevant Instruments

A comprehensive security regime for international shipping entered into force on 1 July 2004. The mandatory security measures, adopted in December 2002, include a number of amendments to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS), the most far-reaching of which enshrines the new International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), which contains detailed security-related requirements for Governments, port authorities and shipping companies in a mandatory section (Part A), together with a series of guidelines about how to meet these requirements in a second, non-mandatory section (Part B).


The following types of ships engaged on international voyages

  • Passenger ships, including high-speed passenger craft
  • Cargo ships, including high-speed craft, of 500 gross tonnage and upwards
  • Mobile offshore drilling units

Ships intending to enter Korea ports

  • Korean government requires that ships intending to enter Korean ports provide the following information to officers duly authorized by Korean government to ensure compliance with chapter XI-2 of SOLAS prior to 24 hours entry into port with the aim of avoiding the need to impose control measures or steps:
    1. 1. the ship possesses a valid Certificate and the name of its issuing authority
    2. 2. the security level at which the ship is currently operating
    3. 3. records of the last 10 calls at port facilities
    4. 4. any special or additional security measures that were taken by the ship in any previous port where it has conducted a ship/port interface within the timeframe specified in the last 10calls.
  • If ships do not provide above information or after receipt of the information, officers duly authorized have clear grounds for believing that the ship is in non-compliance with the requirements of chapter XI-2 of SOLAS or part A of the ISPS Code, officers may take steps as follows
    • A requirement for the rectification of the non-compliance
    • A requirement that the ship proceed to a location specified in the territorial sea or internal waters of Korean Government
    • Inspection of the ship
    • Denial of entry into port

Conduct of PSC Inspection of ship security

  • Initial inspection
    • To verifying that there is onboard a valid (Interim) International Ship Security Certificate issued under the provisions of part A of the ISPS Code, Continuous Synopsis Record issued under the regulation of SOLAS
  • Detailed inspection
    • If there are clear grounds for believing that the ship is not in compliance with the requirements of chapter XI-2 of SOLAS or part A of the ISPS Code, detailed inspection should be carried out.

Clear grounds

  • The following types of ships engaged on international voyages
    • ISSC is not valid or it has expired
    • The ship is at a lower security level than the port
    • Drills related to the security of the ship have not been carried out
    • Records for the last 10 ship/port or ship/ship interfaces are incomplete
    • Evidence or observation that key members of ship's personnel cannot communicate with each other
    • Evidence from observations of aspects listed in Annex that serious deficiencies exist in security arrangements.
    • Information from third parties such as a report or a complaint concerning security related information The ship holds a subsequent, consecutively issued Interim International Ship Security Certificate and in
    • the professional judgement of the PSCO one of the purposes of the ship or company in requesting such a certificates is to avoid full compliance with SOLAS74 chapter XI-2 and part A of the ISPS Code

Control measures

  • If there is no valid International Ship Security Certificate(ISSC) or Interim ISSC onboard the PSCO will detain the ship
  • All other control measures will be decided by the competent security authority.
    • more detailed inspection of the ship
    • Delay of the ship
    • Detention of the ship
    • Restrictions of operations including movement within the port
    • Expulsion of the ship from the port
    • Additional or alternative lesser administrative or corrective measures.